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Abstract
In Steiner tree game associated with a graph G = (V; E), players consist of a subset N ⊆ V
of nodes. The characteristic function value of a subset S ⊆ N of the players is the minimum
weight of a Steiner tree that spans S. We show that it is NP-hard to determine whether a Steiner
tree game is totally balanced, i.e., cores for all its subgames are non-empty. In addition, the
NP-hardness result is also proven for deciding whether the core is non-empty, or whether an
imputation is a member of the core.
? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cooperative game; Steiner tree; Core; Total balancedness; NP-hard
1. Introduction
A cooperative game  = (N; c) consists of a player set N = {1; 2; : : : ; n} and a
characteristic function c : 2N → R, where, for each subset S of N , c(S) represents the
cost incurred by the coalition of players in S without participation of other players.
The main issue is how to fairly distribute the total cost c(N ) among all the players.
A vector x = {x1; x2; : : : ; xn} is called an imputation if and only if
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ).
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The core is de?ned by
Core() = {x∈Rn : x(N ) = v(N ) and x(S)6 v(S); ∀S ⊆ N};
where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
The study of the core is closely associated with another important concept, the
balanced set. The collection B of subsets S of N is balanced if there exists a set of
positive numbers S , S ∈B, such that for each i∈N , we have
∑
i∈S∈B S =1. A game
(N; v) is called balanced if
∑
S∈B Sv(S)¿ v(N ) holds for every balanced collection
B with weights {S : S ∈B}. Bondareva [2] and Shapley [16] proved that a game has
a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced.
For a subset S ⊆ N , we de?ne the induced subgame (S; vS) on S: vS(T ) = v(T ) for
every subset T of S. A cooperative game  is called totally balanced if all its subgames
are balanced, i.e., all its subgames have non-empty cores. This concept was introduced
by Shapley and Shubik [17] in the study of market games. They showed that the
collection of market games are the same as the collection of totally balanced games.
Several other classes of cooperative games were also shown to be equivalent to totally
balanced games, such as, the maximum Dow game introduced by Kalai and Zemel [13]
and the linear production game discussed by Owen [15] and Curiel [3]. Recently, Deng
et al. [6] considered total balancedness of some interesting combinatorial optimization
games. They presented a complete characterization for a class of partition games to be
totally balanced, and the relationship between some totally balanced games and their
related combinatorial structures. Most were shown to be polynomially decidable. The
worst complexity for totally balanced conditions is obtained for a coloring game, for
which total balancedness was shown to be equivalent to a graph being perfect. The
total balancedness condition is a very strong requirement (core being non-empty for
all subgames), and it was challenged to ?nd an example for which no polynomial time
algorithm is known to decide total balancedness [4]. In this work we show this is true
for Steiner tree games if NP is not the same as P.
Steiner tree games were introduced by Megiddo [14]. Suppose that there is a central
supplier oHering service to a set of consumers through a given network. It is required
to connect all the consumers to the central supplier. The connection is not limited
to use direct links between two consumers or a consumer and the central supplier,
it may pass through additional nodes, called switches, in the network. We wish to
construct a cheapest connection and distribute the connection cost among the consumers
fairly. Let G = (V; E;!) be a weighted graph with V = {v0} ∪ N ∪M , where N;M ⊆
V \ {v0} are disjoint. v0 represents the central supplier, N represents the consumer
set and M represents the switch set. The weight !(e) denotes the cost of connecting
the two endpoints of edge e directly. Steiner tree game (G) ≡ (N; v) is de?ned as
follows:
(1) The player set is N ;
(2) For each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the weight of minimal Steiner tree on G w.r.t.
the set S ∪ {v0}, that is,
v(S) = min{!(TS) :TS = (VS; ES) is a subtree of G such that S ∪ {v0}⊆VS};
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where !(TS) =
∑
e∈ES !(e). In a subgame (GS) ≡ (S; v) (S ⊆ N ), for each
coalition S ′ ⊆ S, v(S ′) is the weight of minimum Steiner tree of G w.r.t. the
subset S ′ ∪ {v0}, where all vertices in N \ S are treated as switches but not
consumers.
There are two other related game theoretical formulations for this practical problem:
minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) game and monotone MCST game. Let G =
(V; E;!) be a weighted graph with V = N ∪ {v0}. In MCST game G ≡ (N; u), for
each coalition S ⊆ N , u(S) = min{!(TS) :TS = (VS; ES) is a subtree of G with VS =
S ∪ {v0}}. In monotone MCST game ′G ≡ (N; u′), for each coalition S ⊆ N , u′(S) =
min{!(TS) :TS=(VS; ES) is a subtree of G with VS ⊇ S∪{v0}}. The class of monotone
MCST games is a subclass of Steiner tree games only under the restriction that the set
of switches is empty. Bird [1], and independently, Granot and Huberman [11] presented
a proof for the non-emptyness of the core for both MCST game and monotone MCST
game: Find a minimum cost spanning tree T of G and allocate to player i∈N the
weight of the ?rst edge that i encounters on the path from i to v0 in T . DiHerent from
these two games, the core of Steiner tree game may in general be empty. An example
with empty core was given in Megiddo [14]. On the other hand, Granot and Maschler
[12] showed that, if there exist an optimal spanning tree TG, which spans the nodes
of all consumers and all switches, such that no two switches are adjacent in TG, then
the core of the corresponding Steiner tree game is not empty.
The computational complexity as a rationality measure for game theoretical concepts
has attracted more and more attention recently. Various interesting complexity structures
have started to emerge as a result, especially for the study of the core. Deng and
Papadimitriou [7] found a game for which the core is non-empty if and only if a
certain imputation (Shapley value in this case) is in the core. For the MCST game, the
core is always non-empty and a member in the core can be found in polynomial time
[11]; however, Faigle, et al. [8] show that membership testing is co-NP-complete. Deng
et al. [5] discussed the complexity of the core for a class of combinatorial optimization
games. Goemans and Skutella [10] recently showed that, for a facility location game,
if the core is non-empty, a solution in the core can be found in polynomial time, and
membership testing can be done in polynomial time. However, it is NP-complete to
decide if a core is not empty.
In Section 2, we show it is NP-hard to decide whether a Steiner tree game is totally
balanced, it is the ?rst example of NP-hardness for the totally balanced condition. In
Section 3, we prove that, given an imputation of a Steiner tree game, checking if it
belongs to the core is also NP-hard.
2. Complexity of testing total balancedness
In this section, we prove that the problem of testing total balancedness of the Steiner
tree game is NP-hard. And because of the speci?c reduction we constructed, the result
also holds for the problem of testing non-emptyness of the core. In our proof, we will
use 3-PARTITION, which is shown to be NP-complete in strong sense in the book of
Garey and Johnson [9].
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3-PARTITION is de?ned as follows:
Instance: A ?nite set A = {a1; a2; : : : ; a3m}, a bound B∈Z+, and a size: s(a)∈Z+
for each a∈A, such that
B
4
¡s(a)¡
B
2
∀a∈A;
∑
a∈A
s(a) = mB:
Question: Can A be partitioned into m disjoint sets S1; S2; : : : ; Sm, such that for
16 i6m∑
a∈Si
s(a) = B?
Theorem 2.1. Testing total balancedness for Steiner tree games is NP-hard.
Proof. Given any instance of 3-PARTITION; we let R = {R :R is a 3−set of A};
r = |R|=
(
3m
3
)
; and Q= {Q :Q is a (3m− 1)− set of A}; q= |Q|= 3m.
(I) First we construct a weighted graph G = (V; E;!).
• The node set V = {v0} ∪ N ∪M is given as follows:
{v0} is corresponding to the supplier;
N = A is corresponding to the set of consumers;
M =R ∪ Q ∪ {u0} is corresponding to the set of switches.
• The edge set E=E1∪E2∪E3∪E4∪E5, and the edge weight function ! :E → R+
are de?ned as follows:
E1 = {(a; R): a∈R, for all a∈A; R∈R}, ∀e∈E1; !(e) = 6mB;
E2 = {(a; Q): a∈Q, for all a∈A;Q∈Q}, ∀e∈E2; !(e) = 6mB+ 5B=3;
E3 = {(R; u0): R∈R},
∀e = (R; u0)∈E3; !(e) =


B if
∑
a∈R
s(a)6B;
3B
2
if
∑
a∈R
s(a)¿B;
E4 = {(Q; v0): Q∈Q}, ∀e∈E4; !(e) = mB− B=3;
E5 = {(u0; v0)}, !(u0; v0) = 5mB.
Denote the corresponding Steiner tree game by (G) ≡ (N; v). For convenience
of comprehension, we give a sketch of the graph G = (V; E;!) in Fig. 1. Notice
that
(1) The weight of each edge e∈E1∪E2 is suPciently large so that in any minimum
Steiner tree of G w.r.t. S ∪ {v0} (S ⊆ N ), there are exactly |S| edges in E1 ∪ E2.
(2) The construction of edge (u0; v0) is to ensure that for any proper subset of N ,
the vertices in R are not needed in the corresponding minimum Steiner
tree.
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Fig. 1. G = (V; E;!).
(II) We show that the cores of all proper subgames of (G) are non-empty. Let S
be any proper subset of N , |S|6 3m− 1. Assume that TS = (VS; ES) is the minimum
Steiner tree of G w.r.t. S ∪ {v0}, then it must be the case
VS = {v0} ∪ S ∪ Q;
where the set Q∈Q is an arbitrary set containing S. That is, ES consists of one edge
in E4 and |S| edges in E2,
v(S) = 6mB|S|+ 53B|S|+ mB− 13B:=v∗S : (2.1)
Let
x(a) =
v∗S
|S| = 6mB+
5B
3
+
(3m− 1)B
3|S| ∀a∈ S:
It is easy to verify that it is an element in the core of (GS).
(III) We prove that the game (G) has non-empty core if and only if A has a
3-partition.
Assume that T = (VN ; EN ) is the minimum Steiner tree of G w.r.t. N ∪ {v0}, then
we have
VN = {v0} ∪ N ∪ {R1; : : : ; Rm};
where R1; : : : ; Rm ∈R and
⋃m
i=1 Ri = A. That is, EN consists of the edge (u0; v0), m
edges in E3 and 3m edges in E1, and
v(N )6 6mB · 3m+ m3B
2
+ 5mB= 18m2B+
13
2
mB:=v∗N : (2.2)
In fact, it is trivial for m= 1, and when m¿ 1 we have
(a) If EN does not contain any edges in E1 ∪ E3 ∪ E5, then it must consist of 3m
edges in E2 and two edges in E4, and v(N ) = 2(mB − B=3) + 3m(6mB + 5B=3)¿v∗N ,
a contradiction.
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(b) If EN contains k (0¡k¡ 3m) edges in E2, then it must contain one edge in E4,
and v(N )¿ (mB−B=3)+ k(6mB+5B=3)+5mB+(3m− k)6mB+ (3m− k)=3B¿v∗N ,
also a contradiction.
If A has a 3-PARTITION, then
v(N ) = 6mB · 3m+ mB+ 5mB= 18m2B+ 6mB:
Let x(a) = 6mB + 2B; ∀a∈N . By formula (2.1), it is easy to verify that it is a core
member of (G).
If A has no 3-partition, suppose the core of (G) is not empty and x∈Core((G)).
Since x(N ) = v(N )¿ 18m2B + 6mB, there must be a (3m − 1)-element subset Q∗ of
N such that
x(Q∗)¿
3m− 1
3m
(18m2B+ 6mB) = (3m− 1)(6mB+ 2B):
By formula (2.1), we have
v(Q∗) = 6mB(3m− 1)+ 5
3
B(3m− 1)+mB− B
3
= (3m− 1)(6mB+ 2B)¡x(Q∗);
which is contrary to our hypothesis that x∈Core((G)).
Therefore, the (G) is totally balanced if and only if A has 3-PARTITION. Also
the construction of (G) can be carried out in polynomial time, so testing total bal-
ancedness of Steiner tree games is NP-hard.
From the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can get the complexity on testing balancedness
obviously.
Corollary 2.2. Testing balancedness for Steiner tree games is NP-hard.
3. Complexity of checking membership
Faigle et al. [8] proved that the problem of checking membership in the core for
MCST games is co-NP-complete. Much in the spirit of their proof, we will show that
checking membership in the core for Steiner tree games is co-NP-hard, even for a
balanced game.
Theorem 3.1. The following problem is NP-hard: Given a balanced Steiner tree game
(G) = (N; v) on weighted graph G = (V; E;!) and a vector x∈Rn (n = |N |) with
x(N ) = v(N ); does there exist a coalition S ⊆ N such that x(S)¿v(S)?
Proof. Given an arbitrary instance of EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C): a ?nite
set X = {x1; x2; : : : ; x3q} and a collection F = {f1; f2; : : : ; f|F|} of 3-element subsets of
X (q¿ 2; |F |¿ 2q). We ?rst construct a Steiner tree game (G) on weighted graph
G = (V; E;!) and a candidate vector x for a core member.
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Fig. 2. G = (V; E;!).
The vertex set V of G consists of four parts:
• NX = {v1; v2; : : : ; v3q}, the vertex vi ∈NX is corresponding to the element xi ∈X ,
i = 1; 2; : : : ; 3q, NX represents a subset of consumers;
• NF = {u1; u2; : : : ; u|F|}, the vertex uj ∈NF is corresponding to the subset fj ∈F ,
j = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |, NF also represents a subset of consumers;
• g1 and g2 are two additional vertices, they represent switches;
• v0 represents central supplier.
Thus, V =NX ∪NF ∪ {g1; g2; v0}. Let N =NX ∪NF , n= |N |=3q+ |F | (See Fig. 2).
The edge set E of G and edge weight function ! :E → R+ are de?ned as follows:
• a0 = (v0; g1); !(a0) = 2q− 1;
• b0 = (g1; g2); !(b0) = q+ 1;
• E1 = {(g1; ui): i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |}; ∀e∈E1: !(e) = q+ 1;
• E2 = {(g2; ui): i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |}; ∀e∈E2: !(e) = q;
• E3 = {(ui; vj): xj ∈fi; i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |; j = 1; 2; : : : ; 3q}; ∀e∈E3: !(e) = 2q+ 1.
The edge set E = {a0; b0} ∪ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 (See Fig. 2). Denote the Steiner tree game
on the weighted graph G by (G) = (N; v).
Our construction of graph G is much similar to that in Faigle et al. [8]. The only
diHerence is the weights of edges in E3. The weights of edges in E3 are suPciently
large so that each vertex in NX does not serve as a switch in the minimum Steiner
tree of G. For any coalition S ⊆ N , denote the minimum Steiner tree w.r.t. S ∪ {v0}
by TS = (VS; ES). We have
(1) If |S ∩ NF |¡q+ 1, then ES ∩ E2 = ∅, and
v(S) = !(ES) = (2q− 1) + (q+ 1)|S ∩ NF |+ (2q+ 1)|S ∩ NX |: (3.1)
(2) If |S ∩ NF |¿q+ 1, then ES ∩ E1 = ∅, and
v(S) = !(ES) = (2q− 1) + (q+ 1) + q|S ∩ NF |+ (2q+ 1)|S ∩ NX |: (3.2)
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(3) If |S ∩ NF |= q+ 1, then either ES ∩ E1 = ∅ or ES ∩ E2 = ∅, and
v(S) = !(ES) = (2q− 1) + (q+ 1)2 + (2q+ 1)|S ∩ NX |: (3.3)
Therefore, for the grand coalition N , v(N ) = 6q(q+ 1) + q|F |. Let
y(ui) = q+
3q
3q+ |F | ∀i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |;
y(vj) = 2q+ 1 +
3q
3q+ |F | ∀j = 1; 2; : : : ; 3q;
it is easy to verify that y∈Core((G)), this game is balanced.
De?ne x∈Rn be a candidate for a core member
x(ui) = q ∀i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F |;
x(vj) = 2q+ 2; ∀j = 1; 2; : : : ; 3q:
We shall claim that x is not in Core((G)) if and only if F contains an exact cover
for X .
Assume x is not in Core((G)), and let S ⊆ N be a coalition satisfying x(S)¿v(S).
Then S must possess the following properties:
(1) |S ∩ NF | = q. If |S ∩ NF |¿ q + 1, then by formulas (3.2) and (3.3) we have
0¡x(S) − v(S)6 |S ∩ NX | − 3q, which is contrary to the fact that |S ∩ NX |6 3q.
Hence |S ∩ NF |6 q. Since each vertex in NF is adjacent only to 3 vertices in NX ,
|S ∩ NX |6 3|S ∩ NF |. So by formula (3.1), we have
0¡x(S)− v(S)6 |S ∩ NX | − |S ∩ NF | − (2q− 1)6 2|S ∩ NF | − (2q− 1);
implying |S ∩ NF |¿ q. Therefore, |S ∩ NF |= q.
(2) |S ∩ NX | = 3q. Suppose that |S ∩ NX | = k, by the analysis of (2) and formula
(3.1), we have 0¡x(S)− v(S) = k − 3q+ 1, it implies that k = 3q.
Therefore, the assumption of x ∈ Core((G)) implies F contains an exact cover of
X .
On the other hand, if F admits an exact 3-cover F ′ = {fi1 ; fi2 ; : : : ; fiq}, let S =
{uik : k = 1; 2; : : : ; q} ∪ NX , then v(S) = 7q2 + 6q− 1¡ 7q2 + 6q= x(S), which implies
that x is not in Core((G)).
Our construction of game (G) and the candidate core member x can be carried out
in polynomial time, the proof is ?nished.
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